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		Tolga	Sinmazdemir	tolga.sinmazdemir@boun.edu.tr	Boğaziçi	University,	Department	of	Political	Science	&	International	Relations	Bebek,	Istanbul	Turkey,	34342			Abstract	How	does	terrorism	affect	land	control	in	intrastate	conflicts?	This	paper	explores	this	question	in	the	case	of	the	Israeli-Palestinian	conflict	during	the	Second	Intifada	(2000-2005),	and	shows	that	Palestinian	attacks	lead	to	an	expansion	of	Israeli	outposts	in	the	disputed	territories	of	the	West	Bank.	Following	suicide	attacks,	there	is	an	increase	in	outposts	in	home	districts	of	the	perpetrators.	The	number	of	outposts	also	increases	following	deadly	attacks	against	Israelis	in	West	Bank	districts	where	these	attacks	take	place.	These	results	suggest	that	Israeli	settlers	use	outpost	expansion	as	retaliation	against	Palestinian	communities	they	perceive	to	be	involved	in	violence,	and	this	shifts	territorial	control	against	Palestinians.					
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How	does	terrorism	affect	land	control	in	intrastate	conflicts?	Previous	studies	on	the	effects	of	terrorism	have	shown	that	violence	reduces	political	tolerance,1	increases	exclusionist	attitudes,2	and	strengthens	support	for	hawkish	policies	and	for	organizations	that	are	less	willing	to	make	concessions	to	solve	the	conflict.3	Importantly,	these	studies	show	that	violence	has	a	stronger	effect	on	those	who	reside	in	the	vicinity	of	attacks,	thereby	suggesting	that	terrorism	has	a	special	impact	on	communities	that	are	exposed	to	violence.	This	paper	contributes	to	this	literature	by	analyzing	the	relationship	between	Palestinian	violence	against	Israelis	and	expansion	of	Israeli	outposts	in	the	West	Bank	(WB)	during	the	Second	Intifada	(2000-2005).	The	findings	reported	here	show	that	Palestinian	attacks	lead	to	a	proliferation	in	the	number	of	outposts	and	to	an	increase	of	the	size	of	private	Palestinian	land	used	for	outposts’	construction.	Most	notably,	the	effect	of	violence	is	local:	outposts	expand	in	home	districts	of	suicide	bombers,	and	in	areas	of	the	WB	where	attacks	against	Israelis	take	place.	This	is	consistent	with	the	argument	that	violence	contributes	to	further	radicalization	of	the	target	populace,	and	results	in	additional	escalation	of	conflict.4		This	paper	focuses	on	changes	in	land	control	in	the	WB	that	is	one	of	the	core	issues	of	contention	between	Israel	and	the	Palestinians.5	Figure	1	shows	the	map	of	the	pre-1967	Israeli	borders,	as	well	as	the	Palestinian	districts	in	the	WB	and	in	Gaza.	Palestinian	organizations	that	use	violence	against	Israeli	civilians	have	repeatedly	declared	that	land	control,	and	especially	the	removal	of	Israeli	settlers	from	the	WB	and	Gaza,	is	among	their	primary	goals.6	On	the	Israeli	side,	some	also	perceive	land	control	in	the	WB	as	a	realization	of	the	Jewish	claim	to	the	Land	of	
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Israel,7	or	at	least	as	a	political	card	to	be	used	in	future	negotiations8	as	well	as	a	way	of	countering	Palestinian	nationalistic	demands.9		[Figure	1	about	here.]	Land	control	is	measured	here	using	data	on	outposts’	expansion	in	the	WB.	Outposts	are	settlements	established	by	private	Israelis	without	explicit	government	authorization,	but	in	many	cases	with	tacit	approval	and	even	assistance	of	state	institutions.10	Given	that	Israel	has	not	established	new	settlements	in	the	WB	since	the	early	1990	(although	existing	settlements	were	significantly	expanded),	the	illegal	establishment	of	outposts	provides	an	observable	measure	of	changes	in	territorial	control	in	the	WB.		The	purpose	of	outposts	is	to	expand	the	Israeli	territorial	presence	in	the	WB.	Between	1991	and	2005,	settlers	established	99	outposts,	some	built	on	private	land	owned	by	Palestinians.11	About	half	of	the	outposts	were	established	during	the	Second	Intifada,	after	March	2001.	Some	of	them	are	not	inhabited,	and	involve	capture	of	land	by	placing	containers	in	remote	places.	Other	outposts	resemble	residential	neighborhoods,	and	are	often	constructed	adjacent	to	existing	settlements.	Several	of	the	outposts	were	evacuated	by	the	army,	but	almost	immediately	reestablished	by	the	settlers.	Figure	2	depicts	the	map	of	Israeli	settlements	and	outposts.		 [Figure	2	about	here.]		To	explore	the	effect	of	violence	on	outposts,	this	study	uses	detailed	data	on	the	districts	of	origin	of	Palestinian	suicide	bombers	during	the	Second	Intifada	(2000-2005).	In	addition,	this	paper	utilizes	an	originally	coded	dataset	on	
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Palestinian	attacks	against	Israelis	in	the	WB,	and	examines	the	relationship	between	outposts’	expansion	and	locations	of	attacks	in	the	WB.		One	possible	explanation	for	the	reported	correlation	between	attacks	and	outposts	is	that	territorial	expansion	of	outposts	leads	to	attacks,	and	not	vice	versa.	While	acknowledging	this	possibility,	this	paper	provides	evidence	that	causality	also	runs	in	the	opposite	direction.	To	isolate	this	causal	effect,	this	paper	compares	districts	with	successful	attacks	to	districts	with	failed	attacks,	assuming	that	success	and	failure	are	random,	conditional	on	attack	being	initiated.12	The	results	suggest	that	home	districts	of	successful	suicide	attackers	experience	an	addition	of	0.5	outposts	in	the	quarter	following	a	successful	attack,	compared	to	districts	that	produced	failed	attacks.	Similarly,	the	number	of	outposts	increases	by	0.7	in	WB	districts	where	fatal	attacks	against	Israelis	take	place	in	the	post-attack	quarter.	These	are	substantively	significant	effects	given	the	high	number	of	attacks	during	these	years.	Analysis	of	the	changes	in	the	size	of	private	Palestinian	land	that	lies	within	the	boundaries	of	these	outposts	also	suggests	a	significant	increase	in	seizure	of	land	following	attacks.	Violence	in	this	period,	therefore,	leads	to	changes	in	land	control,	and	at	least	in	the	short-term	undermines	the	Palestinian	goals	of	land	control.	Several	concrete	examples	illustrate	the	expansion	of	outposts	following	violence.	New	neighborhoods	are	often	named	after	people	that	had	been	killed	by	Palestinians.	For	example,	the	outpost	Ester's	Stronghold	(Ma'oz	Ester)	was	established	to	commemorate	Ester	Ga'aliya,	who	lived	in	a	nearby	settlement,	and	was	killed	in	an	attack	in	that	area	in	2006.13	Likewise,	an	outpost	near	Itamar	is	
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called	AARYH,	which	is	an	abbreviation	of	the	first	names	of	the	family	members	killed	in	the	Itamar	attack	in	2011.14	The	connection	between	violence	and	changes	in	territorial	control	are	not	limited	to	outposts.	On	several	occasions,	the	Israeli	government	approved	extensive	construction	and	expansion	of	existing	WB	settlements	following	attacks.	One	prominent	example	is	the	announcement	of	500	new	housing	units	in	the	settlement	of	Itamar	immediately	after	the	murder	of	five	family	members	by	a	Palestinian	who	had	infiltrated	that	settlement	in	March	2011.15	At	the	Government	session	convened	to	vote	on	the	extension,	the	Minister	of	Interior	declared	that	"1000	units	should	be	approved"	for	each	murdered	Israeli.16	This	paper	moves	beyond	these	anecdotal	cases,	and	provides	a	systematic	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	violence	and	expansion	of	outposts.		The	findings	reported	here	focus	on	the	short-term,	local	effects	of	attacks	on	land	control.	There	is,	however,	also	the	question	of	the	long-term	effect	of	violence.	For	instance,	Israeli	withdrawal	from	Gaza	and	from	four	settlements	in	the	WB	in	2005	may	be	considered	as	an	example	of	a	cumulative	effect	of	attacks	that	ultimately	advance	Palestinians’	political	goals	of	land	control,	despite	the	short-term	costs	and	setbacks.	However,	empirically	identifying	the	causal	effect	of	violence	on	these	withdrawals	is	impossible	because	there	is	no	control	case	of	Palestinian	non-violence.	This	study,	therefore,	focuses	on	the	local	and	immediate	effects	of	violence	on	outposts.	Moreover,	there	are	reasons	to	believe	that	these	short-term	effects	also	shape	the	long-term	patterns	of	land	control.	As	long	as	the	conflict	remains	unresolved,	local	changes	in	land	control	are	rarely,	if	ever,	reversed.	Instead,	they	create	"facts	on	the	ground"	that	shape	any	future	attempts	
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at	negotiating	the	permanent	peace	agreement.	That	said,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	the	temporal	limitations	of	this	analysis,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	it	is	based	on	a	specific	time	period,	between	2000	and	2005.		This	paper	proceeds	as	follows.	It	first	situates	the	question	within	the	existing	literature	on	the	effects	of	exposure	to	terrorism,	and	identifies	hypotheses	that	are	tested	in	the	empirical	section.	Then,	it	presents	the	data	and	the	descriptive	statistics	of	the	main	variables.	Afterwards,	it	outlines	the	methodology	and	reviews	the	results.	The	final	section	concludes	by	considering	the	implications	of	these	findings	for	theories	of	civil	conflict.		
Extant	Literature	on	the	Effects	of	Exposure	to	Violence	and	Terrorism	
The	Effect	of	Violence	and	Terrorism	on	the	Targets	A	growing	body	of	research	reports	that	exposure	to	political	violence	has	multiple	effects	on	targeted	individuals	and	societies.	One	of	the	most	documented	consequences	of	terrorism	in	Israel	is	the	increase	in	support	for	right-wing	parties	among	Jewish	voters	who	reside	in	areas	that	were	previously	targeted	by	terrorists.	For	example,	Berrebi	and	Klor	find	that	Palestinian	suicide	attacks	against	Israeli	targets	lead	to	a	rightward	shift	in	voting	patterns	in	areas	that	were	attacked.17	Getmansky	and	Zeitzoff	further	show	that	terrorism	affects	also	voters	who	do	not	reside	in	areas	that	experienced	high	casualty	attacks.	Merely	being	in	range	of	terrorism	(for	example,	residing	in	Israeli	localities	within	the	range	of	rockets	fired	from	the	Gaza	strip,	but	not	necessarily	being	targeted	by	rockets)	is	sufficient	to	make	voters	more	right-wing.18	Since	right-wing	parties	in	Israel	are	
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less	supportive	of	granting	political	concessions	to	Palestinians,	and	more	supportive	of	expansion	of	settlements	in	the	WB,	this	effect	is	perceived	as	a	sign	of	political	ineffectiveness	of	terrorism	as	a	strategy	to	extract	concessions.19	Outside	of	the	Israeli	case,	Kibris	reports	that	fatal	PKK	attacks	against	security	forces	in	Turkey	increase	vote	shares	of	Turkish	nationalistic	parties.20	However,	in	the	case	of	Spain,	Bali	as	well	as	Montalvo	show	that	the	2004	Madrid	bombings	shifted	the	electoral	map	to	the	left	against	an	unpopular	foreign	policy.21	Nonetheless,	in	the	United	States,	Albertson	and	Kushner-Gadarian	find	that	exposure	to	news	about	terrorism	increases	anxiety	that	in	turn	leads	to	greater	support	for	hawkish	policies	(including	hawkish	foreign	policy),	augments	anti-immigrant	attitudes,	and	bolsters	trust	in	Republican	candidates.22	Similarly,	Jaeger	et	al.	find	that	exposure	to	Israeli	violence	leads	Palestinians	to	support	more	hawkish	factions	and	to	adopt	more	radical	attitudes	towards	conflict,	especially	in	the	immediate	period	after	witnessing	violence	(within	90	days).	These	effects	are	particularly	pronounced	among	those	with	high	propensity	for	radicalism.23	Furthermore,	the	effect	of	terrorism	is	not	limited	to	voting	and	political	attitudes.	Peffley,	Hutchinson,	and	Shamir	find	that	persistent	exposure	to	terrorist	attacks	in	Israel	eroded	support	for	democratic	values	and	political	tolerance	towards	Palestinians.24	Studies	in	political	psychology	help	explain	some	of	these	effects.	Central	to	these	studies	is	the	finding	that	threats	(real	or	perceived)	prompt	bigotry	towards	members	of	the	out-group.	In	this	context,	Canetti-Nisim	et	al.	propose	that	personal	exposure	to	death	due	to	terrorism	heightens	perceived	threats	and	psychological	distress	that	lead	to	elevated	exclusionist	attitudes.	They	
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show	that	Israeli	Jews	who	are	personally	exposed	to	Palestinian	terrorist	attacks	(for	example,	those	who	know	people	who	were	killed	in	terrorist	attacks)	are	more	likely	to	oppose	granting	equal	rights	to	Palestinian	citizens	of	Israel.25	Moreover,	threats	to	abstract	aspects	of	the	collective	(such	as	in-group	identity,	belief	system,	and	worldview)	have	a	greater	influence	on	attitudes	towards	rights	and	liberties	of	the	out-group	than	tangible	threats.26	In	sum,	this	literature	presents	a	pessimistic	account	whereby	exposure	to	terrorism	and	continued	threats	increase	negative	attitudes	among	the	targeted	individuals	and	bolster	their	support	for	retaliatory	policies	towards	the	group	that	the	perpetrators	claim	to	represent.		In	addition	to	deepening	inter-group	divisions,	terrorism	has	been	shown	in	some	cases	to	increase	intra-group	cohesion	and	cooperation.	In	a	series	of	experiments	in	Israel,	Zeitzoff	demonstrates	that	Israeli	Jewish	civilians	who	experienced	rocket	attacks	from	Gaza	are	less	likely	to	lash	out	against	a	member	of	their	community	who	behaves	uncooperatively	(compared	to	similar	civilians	who	were	not	exposed	to	rocket	attacks,	or	exposed	to	them	to	a	lesser	extent).27	Beyond	Israel,	studies	from	over	40	other	countries	found	that	exposure	to	violence	during	civil	wars	increased	levels	of	collective	action	(such	as	voting	and	community	organization)	and	pro-social	behavior,	but	mainly	towards	people	from	the	same	community.28	Thus,	while	terrorism	increases	inter-group	animosity,	it	may	also	contribute	to	intra-group	cohesion	and	prompt	individuals	to	engage	in	what	they	believe	to	be	pro-social	behavior	for	their	own	group.		
The	Effect	of	Violence	and	Terrorism	on	the	Perpetrators’	Communities	
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	In	addition	to	studies	on	the	effect	of	violence	on	the	targets,	a	smaller	body	of	research	explores	the	effects	of	terrorism	on	the	perpetrators’	communities.	Most	of	these	studies	focus	on	the	economic	effects	of	terrorism,	and	find	that	violence	causes	economic	harm	to	the	communities	that	the	terrorists	claim	to	represent.	Abadie	and	Gardeazabal	explore	the	effect	of	attacks	by	ETA	(a	Basque	separatist	organization)	on	the	economic	development	of	the	Basque	Country,	where	most	of	the	violence	took	place	between	1968	and	1997.29	They	find	that	terrorism	lowers	the	per	capita	GDP	in	that	area	by	about	10	percentage	points	compared	to	what	it	would	have	been	in	the	absence	of	terrorism.	They	claim	that	the	economic	decline	of	the	Basque	region	was	caused	by	the	decrease	in	domestic	and	foreign	direct	investments,	as	well	as	because	many	Basque	entrepreneurs	chose	to	relocate	due	to	concerns	over	ETA’s	kidnappings-for-ransom.30		In	the	Palestinian	case,	Benmelech,	Berrebi,	and	Klor	find	that	Palestinian	suicide	attacks	against	Israel	during	the	Second	Intifada	increase	unemployment	and	decrease	wages	in	home	districts	of	Palestinian	suicide	bombers.	Successful	suicide	attacks	also	decrease	the	number	of	Palestinians	from	the	attackers’	home	districts	who	receive	permits	to	work	in	Israel.31	This	particular	study	does	not	explore	why	Palestinian	suicide	attacks	worsen	the	economic	conditions	in	communities	of	origin	of	the	bombers.		There	may	be	several	reasons	for	the	decline	of	Palestinian	economy,	such	as	tougher	counterterrorism	measures	implemented	in	home	districts	of	suicide	bombers	in	the	aftermath	of	such	attacks.	It	is	also	possible	that	part	of	the	decline	in	the	Palestinian	economy	is	due	to	construction	of	outposts.	There	is	evidence	that	some	outposts	disrupt	Palestinian	agricultural	
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activity.32	In	addition,	settlers’	encroachment	on	private	Palestinian	land	creates	uncertainty	and	lowers	investment	in	Palestinian	areas.33	Expansion	of	outposts,	especially	those	that	disrupt	Palestinian	agriculture	and	are	constructed	on	private	land	owned	by	Palestinians	may	account	for	some	of	the	reduction	in	wages	and	increase	in	unemployment	that	Benmelech,	Berrebi,	and	Klor	report.			
The	Effect	of	Palestinian	Attacks	on	Outposts’	Expansion	in	the	WB	Building	on	these	studies,	we	argue	that	Palestinian	attacks	may	lead	to	outposts’	expansion	due	to	several	reasons.	First,	if	terrorist	attacks	increase	hostility	towards	the	out-group	and	augment	support	for	aggressive	policies,	then	they	may	also	motivate	some	Israelis	to	engage	in	radical	action	and	to	expand	outposts.34	In	particular,	radical	action	may	be	taken	against	home	communities	of	the	terrorists,	as	a	way	of	punishing	them	for	the	attacks.	Second,	the	public	opinion	in	Israel	may	become	more	supportive	of	Israeli	presence	in	the	WB	and	of	aggressive	policy	towards	Palestinians,	especially	those	that	are	perceived	to	be	associated	with	the	attackers.	This	is	also	consistent	with	the	finding	that	violence	increases	intra-group	cohesion	in	targeted	populace.	The	shift	in	public	opinion	against	Palestinians	may	create	a	window	of	opportunity	for	some	settlers	to	expand	outposts	in	the	aftermath	of	violence,	especially	after	spectacular	attacks	such	as	suicide	bombings	that	strike	within	Israel,	and	affect	public	opinion	of	many	Israelis.		 The	combination	of	these	two	arguments	leads	us	to	suggest	the	following	hypothesis:	
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H1:	Israeli	outposts	expand	following	successful	suicide	attacks	in	Palestinian	districts	
of	origin	of	suicide	bombers.		In	addition,	threats	that	are	perceived	to	be	targeting	group	identity	and	worldview	have	particularly	strong	effects	on	exclusionist	attitudes	(see	endnote	25).		According	to	this	logic,	attacks	against	Israelis	in	the	WB,	and	especially	fatal	attacks,	may	be	perceived	by	some	as	threats	against	their	worldview	that	views	the	consolidation	of	Jewish	presence	in	the	WB	as	an	important	goal.	These	perceptions	may	in	turn	trigger	radical	action,	such	as	establishment	and	expansion	of	outposts.		Fatal	attacks	may	be	especially	consequential	because	death	has	been	demonstrated	to	have	an	effect	on	exclusionist	political	attitudes.35	As	a	symbolic	act,	outposts	are	likely	to	be	established	in	the	vicinity	of	places	where	fatal	attacks	happened	in	order	to	demonstrate	that	violence	would	not	end	the	Israeli	presence	in	these	areas.	Finally,	elevated	intra-group	cohesion	and	public	sympathy	towards	settlers	following	attacks	may	further	encourage	expansion	of	outposts.	Thus,	our	second	hypothesis	is:	
H2:	Outposts	expand	in	the	aftermath	of	fatal	attacks	against	Israelis	in	the	WB.	This	
expansion	happens	in	Palestinian	districts	where	these	attacks	took	place.			
Data	and	Descriptive	Statistics	
Dependent	variable	–	changes	in	land	control	To	measure	changes	in	land	control,	this	paper	analyzes	the	establishment	of	outposts	by	Israeli	settlers	in	the	WB	(east	Jerusalem	is	not	included	in	this	analysis).	According	to	Sason	Report36,	outposts	are	WB	settlements	that	do	not	
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satisfy	at	least	one	of	the	four	conditions:	(1)	established	following	a	formal	resolution	by	the	government;	(2)	constructed	only	on	State	land;	(3)	developed	according	to	a	lawful	building	scheme;	and	(4)	jurisdiction	boundaries	were	approved	by	the	Commander	of	the	area.	Whereas	WB	settlements	that	satisfy	all	of	the	four	conditions	are	officially	recognized	under	the	Israeli	law,	outposts	are	considered	illegal	by	the	government.	Due	to	their	unauthorized	nature,	outposts	are	often	established	on	private	Palestinian	land	and	involve	destruction	of	Palestinian	property.37	Unauthorized	outposts	first	emerged	in	early-1990s,	after	the	Rabin	government	had	frozen	the	construction	of	new	official	settlements	in	the	WB	and	Gaza,	and	decreased	the	rate	of	construction	approvals	in	existing	settlements.38	Although	first	outposts	appeared	during	the	1990s,	their	number	significantly	increased	after	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	Intifada.	About	half	of	the	outposts	that	existed	during	2000-2005	period	were	constructed	during	the	Second	Intifada.	Even	though	the	government	does	not	officially	approve	outposts,	some	were	established	with	tacit	agreement,	and	sometimes	with	active	assistance	of	government	authorities,	such	as	the	Ministry	of	Defense,	the	IDF,	the	Ministry	of	Housing	and	other	public	and	official	entities.39	The	exact	number	of	outposts	is	unknown	since	some	of	them	consist	of	a	trailer	or	a	guard	tower	and	might	not	even	be	inhabited.	According	to	Sason	Report,	in	2005	there	were	105	outposts:	26	of	them	were	established	on	State	Land,	7	on	Survey	Land,	15	on	Private	Palestinian	Land,	and	39	on	mixed	land.40	Land	ownership	status	of	the	remaining	outposts	is	not	specified	in	the	report.	In	2002,	
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the	government	officially	promised	to	dismantle	all	outposts	established	after	February	2001,	but	according	to	Peace	Now,	an	NGO	that	monitors	the	Israeli	activities	in	the	WB,	of	the	50	outposts	that	were	established	after	February	2001,	none	have	been	dismantled	so	far.	This	paper	relies	on	the	Peace	Now	list	of	outposts	available	online41,	and	matches	each	outpost	to	a	Palestinian	district.	Most	of	the	outposts	on	that	list	(95	out	of	99)	are	inhabited	(the	estimated	number	of	resident	ranges	from	1	to	800),	and	over	half	have	permanent	houses.	The	change	in	the	number	of	outposts	in	district	quarter	is	the	main	dependent	variable.		As	an	alternative,	and	a	more	nuanced	measure	of	the	territorial	expansion	of	outposts,	this	analysis	uses	data	on	the	size	of	Private	Palestinian	land	seized	by	the	outposts.	These	data	are	also	available	from	Peace	Now.	The	log	of	change	in	square	meters	of	Private	Palestinian	land	used	for	outposts	in	district	quarter	is	the	alternative	measure	of	the	dependent	variable.	Log	transformation	is	applied	to	this	variable	because	the	distribution	of	change	in	land	seizure	is	right-skewed.		
	
Independent	variables	-	violence	Terrorism	is	the	main	independent	variable	measured	using	data	on	Palestinian	attacks	against	Israeli	targets.	This	paper	uses	two	types	of	attacks	to	address	the	two	hypotheses	specified	above:	1)	Palestinian	suicide	attacks	that	originate	from	the	WB,	and	strike	mostly	within	the	pre-1967	Israel;	and	2)	Palestinian	attacks	against	Israeli	targets	within	the	WB.	To	measure	suicide	attacks,	this	paper	relies	on	a	detailed	and	publically	available	dataset	constructed	by	Benmelech	and	Berrebi	based	on	the	annual	reports	of	the	Israeli	Security	Agency	(ISA).42	This	dataset	
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identifies	all	Palestinian	suicide	attacks	that	were	carried	out	from	September	2000	through	December	2006,	and	the	home	district	of	the	perpetrators,	and	thus	it	is	more	compatible	for	the	purpose	of	this	paper	than	other	existing	datasets,	such	as	the	Global	Terrorism	Dataset.	It	codes	the	outcome	of	each	attack	as	either	success	or	failure.	As	the	following	section	explains,	the	distinction	between	successful	and	failed	attacks	allows	identifying	the	effect	of	terrorism.	An	attack	is	coded	as	failed	if	it	results	in	at	least	one	of	the	following:	(1)	an	explosive	device	failed	to	detonate;	(2)	an	attacker	appeared	suspicious,	and	was	apprehended	before	exploding;	(3)	an	attacker	exploded	prematurely;	or	(4)	an	attacker	surrendered	to	the	authorities	without	exploding.	The	dataset	contains	143	suicide	attacks,	39	of	which	are	coded	as	failed.	These	attempts	involved	157	suicide	terrorists.		 Even	though	suicide	attacks	have	been	the	most	lethal	form	of	violence,	they	constitute	only	a	small	fraction	of	all	attacks	during	this	period.43	More	common	modes	of	attack	are	drive-by	shootings,	ambushes,	sniper	shootings,	infiltrations	into	settlements,	and	improvised	explosive	devices	(IEDs)	activated	against	vehicles.	To	investigate	the	effect	of	these	attacks	on	outposts,	this	paper	utilizes	an	original	dataset	compiled	using	news	archives	of	Ynet	website.44	The	resulting	dataset	contains	3,657	attacks	between	September	2000	and	December	2005,	772	of	which	took	place	against	civilian	or	mixed	targets	in	the	WB.	The	identity	and	the	district	of	origin	of	the	perpetrators	are	rarely	reported	for	non-suicide	attacks.	Instead,	this	paper	examines	whether	fatal	attacks	against	Israelis	in	the	WB	increase	the	number	of	outposts	in	Palestinian	districts	where	these	attacks	took	place.	The	focus	on	fatal	attacks	is	useful	for	the	purposes	of	this	investigation	because	such	attacks	
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provide	a	symbolic	opportunity	to	expand	outposts	to	commemorate	the	fatalities.	Indeed,	there	are	several	illustrative	examples	mentioned	in	the	Introduction	that	support	the	possibility	that	fatal	attacks	may	lead	to	outposts’	expansion.	The	focus	on	fatal	attacks	is	also	theoretically	motivated.	Previous	research	found	that	exposure	to	death	contributes	to	exclusionist	attitudes	towards	out-group	that	may	lead	to	outposts’	expansion.45			 The	separate	examination	of	suicide	attacks	and	attacks	within	the	WB	follows	from	the	two	hypotheses	we	outline	above.	In	addition,	there	are	several	advantages	to	analyze	suicide	attacks	separately	from	other	attack	types.	First,	the	higher	lethality	of	suicide	attacks	compared	to	other	modes	of	violence	may	result	in	more	outposts	following	suicide	bombings	because	of	stronger	revenge	or	punishment	motivations	against	home	communities	of	suicide	bombers.	Second,	it	is	also	possible	that	attacks	against	Israelis	in	the	WB	may	result	in	outposts’	expansion	precisely	because	they	target	settlers,	who	may	then	retaliate	by	expanding	outposts.	Finally,	data	considerations	also	require	that	suicide	attacks	are	treated	separately	from	attacks	in	the	WB.	This	is	because	unlike	with	suicide	bombers,	the	district	of	origin	of	non-suicide	attackers	remains	unknown	in	most	cases.	Thus,	it	is	impossible	to	study	the	effect	of	attacks	within	the	WB	on	the	district	of	origin	of	these	attackers.	However,	the	location	of	these	attacks	allows	exploring	whether	outposts	expand	in	places	where	these	attacks	take	place,	as	suggested	by	several	anecdotal	examples	presented	in	the	Introduction	section.	For	these	reasons,	the	analysis	is	done	separately	on	suicide	attacks	and	subsequent	
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expansion	of	outposts	in	the	attackers’	districts	of	origin;	and	attacks	in	the	WB	and	outposts	growth	in	districts	where	these	attacks	take	place.		This	paper	also	adopts	an	innovative	approach	compared	to	many	prior	quantitative	studies	of	the	effects	of	violence	in	the	Israeli-Palestinian	conflict.	Many	of	these	studies	either	exclusively	focus	on	suicide	attacks46,	or	pool	all	attacks	together.47	This	analysis	examines	more	than	one	attack	mode,	while	also	looking	into	possibly	different	effects	of	suicide	attacks	as	opposed	to	other	forms	of	violence.			
Control	variables	The	empirical	tests	control	for	several	alternative	explanations	of	outposts’	expansion.	In	particular,	the	models	control	for	changes	in	the	size	of	the	settler	population:	growth	in	the	number	of	settlers	may	increase	demand	for	new	housing	and	contribute	to	the	establishment	of	outposts.	Additional	controls	pertain	to	the	composition	of	the	settler	population	–	changes	in	the	percent	of	secular,	religious,	and	orthodox	settlers.	Religious	settlers	tend	to	be	more	nationalistic,	and	increase	in	this	population	may	lead	to	more	outposts.	Hirsch-Hoefler,	Canetti,	and	Eiran	show	that	religious	Israeli	settlers	in	the	WB	are	more	likely	than	secular	settlers	to	participate	in	radical	action	(such	as	establishment	of	illegal	outposts)48.	The	data	on	settler	demographics	are	from	Peace	Now.49	Each	settlement	is	classified	by	Peace	Now	as	either	secular,	nationalistic-religious,	orthodox,	or	mixed	using	census	data	from	the	Israel	Central	Bureau	of	Statistics.	This	paper	adopts	this	classification,	and	aggregates	these	numbers	at	district	level.	The	empirical	tests	
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also	control	for	changes	in	the	Palestinian	population	and	unemployment	in	district-quarter	to	make	sure	the	results	are	not	driven	by	developments	in	the	Palestinian	society.	These	data	are	obtained	from	the	Palestinian	Central	Bureau	of	Statistics.50	As	explained	below,	the	empirical	model	used	in	this	paper	allows	controlling	for	time-invariant	district-level	factors,	such	as	distance	from	Israel,	elevation,	and	religious	importance.		Table	1	presents	the	summary	statistics	of	the	main	variables.	[Table	1	about	here.]		
Empirical	Approach	to	Identifying	the	Effect	of	Terrorism	
Empirical	Model	The	unit	of	analysis	is	district-quarter51,	and	the	main	specification	is	an	OLS	regression	of	the	form:		
	Δyi,t=	βSuccessi,t-1	+	γΔXi,t	+	μt+	εi,																			(1)	where	i,t	indexes	a	Palestinian	district-quarter,	Δyi,t	is	the	change	in	the	number	of	outposts	between	t+1	and	t-1	(or	the	change	in	square	meters	of	Private	Palestinian	land	used	for	outposts	in	a	district	between	t+1	and	t-1).	Successi,t	is	a	dummy	equal	to	1	if	there	was	a	successful	attack	in	quarter	t,	and	0	if	it	failed	(successful	suicide	attacks	according	to	the	definitions	presented	above,	and	fatal	attacks	in	the	WB).	
ΔXi,t	is	a	vector	of	the	change	in	other,	district-level	and	time-varying	characteristics	(settler	and	Palestinian	population	size,	and	Palestinian	unemployment	level).	μt		are	year	fixed	effects	that	account	for	time	trends	in	land	control.	εi	is	the	standard	error	
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clustered	at	the	district	level	to	capture	non-systematic	determinants	of	changes	in	outposts.		Due	to	its	first-difference	nature,	this	model	controls	for	time-invariant	factors	and	reduces	the	risk	of	omitted	variable	bias,	such	as	distance,	topography,	and	history.	The	key	identification	assumption	of	this	approach	is	that	Successi,t	is	exogenous,	conditional	on	Xi,t.	Formally,	this	means	that	E[εi,t	|	Successi,t,	Xi,t]=0,	and	the	treatment	effect	of	interest	is:	
β	=	E[yi,t	|	Successi,t	=1,	Xi,t]	–	E[yi,t	|	Successi,t	=0,	Xi,t]		 	 (2)	If	β	is	statistically-different	from	zero,	this	means	that	attacks	affect	the	establishment	of	outposts.		
Identification	Assumptions	This	paper	estimates	the	local	effect	of	attacks	on	outposts	(β)	using	a	variation	in	success	of	terrorism.	For	this	strategy	to	work,	success	and	failure	of	attacks	should	be	uncorrelated	with	the	error	term	in	(1).	Substantively,	this	means	that	district-years	with	successful	and	failed	attacks	should	not	be	different	from	each	other,	and	that	characteristics	that	might	affect	land	control	(Xi,t)	should	be	balanced	across	the	success	and	failure	cases.	If	success	and	failure	cases	are	different	with	respect	to	determinants	of	land	control,	then	identifying	the	causal	effect	of	terrorism	on	outposts	using	this	approach	is	not	possible.	This	is	because	a	positive	correlation	between	successful	attacks	and	subsequent	changes	in	the	number	of	outposts	might	also	occur	because	successful	attacks	are	more	likely	in	districts	with	more	
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outposts	due	to	such	factors	as	religious	importance,	settler	population,	or	Palestinian	population-related	characteristics.		To	investigate	whether	this	assumption	indeed	holds,	Table	2	presents	the	mean	values	of	district-level	variables	in	district-quarters	from	which	failed	and	successful	suicide	attackers	originate,	conditional	on	observing	an	attempted	attack,	and	reports	a	t-test	for	the	equality	of	these	means.	Similarly,	Table	3	reports	the	comparison	of	means	for	districts	where	failed	and	successful	attacks	against	Israelis	occurred,	conditional	on	observing	an	attempted	attack.	[Table	2	about	here.]	[Table	3	about	here.]	These	tables	demonstrate	that	overall	there	is	a	good	balance	in	terms	of	these	characteristics,	except	for	the	size	of	the	Palestinian	population.	The	empirical	tests	control	for	these	variables.				
Results	To	assess	the	effect	of	attacks	on	outposts,	this	paper	estimates	equation	(1)	using	OLS	with	robust	standard	errors,	adjusted	for	clustering	at	the	district	level	to	account	for	serial	correlation	of	the	error	term.	This	section	first	presents	the	results	with	respect	to	suicide	attacks	and	subsequent	changes	in	the	number	of	outposts	in	the	districts	of	origin	of	successful	attackers.	Then,	it	presents	similar	analysis	with	respect	to	expansion	of	outposts	in	districts	where	attacks	take	place.			
The	Effect	of	Suicide	Attacks	on	Outposts’	Expansion	in	Attackers'	Home	Districts	
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Table	4	presents	the	test	of	H1	(effects	of	successful	suicide	attacks	from	a	district	at	year	t	on	the	change	in	the	number	of	outposts	in	that	district	between	t-1	and	t+1).	Model	1	presents	the	results	for	all	district	quarters	and	without	controls.	Model	2	focuses	only	on	districts	from	which	attempted	suicide	attackers	originate,	and	compares	home	districts	of	failed	and	successful	attackers.	Model	3	adds	control	variables	and	examine	all	districts,	and	Model	4	focuses	on	comparison	of	failed	and	successful	attackers	while	controlling	for	district-level	characteristics.	[Table	4	about	here.]		 The	results	in	Table	4	support	H1	and	show	that	outposts	are	more	likely	to	be	established	in	districts	of	origin	of	successful	attackers.	Comparison	between	districts	of	origin	of	successful	attackers	and	other	districts	from	which	failed	attackers	or	no	attackers	emerged	(columns	1	and	3)	reveals	that	the	former	experience	an	increase	of	0.39	in	the	number	of	outposts	(controlling	for	district-level	characteristics;	95%	CI:	[0.037,	0.744]).	When	the	sample	is	restricted	to	districts	with	at	least	one	attempted	attack,	disregarding	districts	from	which	no	suicide	bomber	emerged,	the	sample	size	becomes	smaller.	However,	this	finding	still	holds,	and	the	marginal	effect	increases:	districts	of	successful	suicide	bombers	experience	an	increase	of	0.52	in	the	number	of	outposts	compared	to	districts	of	failed	suicide	attackers	(95%	CI:	[0.018,	1.038]).		This	is	a	substantively	important	finding:	as	shown	in	Table	2,	there	are	54	district-quarters	from	which	suicide	bombers	emerge.			
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The	Effect	of	Fatal	Attacks	in	the	WB	on	Outposts’	Expansion	in	Districts	Where	
Attacks	Take	Place	The	tests	in	Table	5	examine	the	effect	of	fatal	attacks	against	Israelis	in	the	WB	on	outposts’	growth	in	districts	where	these	attacks	take	place	(H2).	Recall	that	in	these	tests	successful	attack	is	defined	as	a	fatal	attack.	[Table	5	about	here.]	Like	in	Table	4,	the	results	here	also	confirm	that	past	violence	has	a	positive	effect	on	outposts’	expansion,	and	the	substantive	effects	are	even	larger.	When	comparing	districts	with	fatal	attacks	to	other	districts	that	have	non-fatal	or	no	attacks,	the	former	experience	an	increase	of	0.79	outposts	in	the	quarter	following	an	attack	(95%	CI:	[0.372,	1.210]).	Exclusion	of	districts	without	attacks,	and	comparison	between	districts	with	fatal	and	non-fatal	attack	suggests	that	the	former	experience	an	increase	of	0.70	in	the	number	of	outposts	following	fatal	attacks	(95%	CI:	[0.282,	1.126]),	in	accordance	with	H2.			
Outposts	Expansion	Measured	Using	Private	Palestinian	Land	Captured	for	Outposts	Table	6	reports	results	of	analysis	using	the	change	in	the	area	of	private	Palestinian	land	within	outposts	as	a	measure	of	the	dependent	variable	(outposts’	expansion).	The	findings	here	support	the	main	results	that	successful	attacks	lead	to	outposts’	growth,	as	well	as	increase	the	usage	of	private	Palestinian	land	for	outposts’	expansion,	in	home	districts	of	suicide	bombers,	as	well	as	in	WB	districts	where	fatal	attacks	against	Israelis	take	place.		[Table	6	about	here.]	
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Overall,	the	findings	in	Tables	4,	5,	and	6	suggest	that	violence	increases	outposts’	construction	–	both	in	terms	of	additional	outposts	as	well	as	Private	Palestinian	land	seizure,	in	districts	of	origin	of	successful	suicide	bombers,	and	in	districts	where	violence	takes	place	in	the	WB.			
Robustness	Checks	This	section	reports	robustness	tests	using	additional	functional	forms,	namely	a	negative	binomial	model	and	a	linear	model	with	lagged	dependent	variable.	The	results	are	in	Table	7.	The	coefficient	signs	remain	positive,	suggesting	outposts’	expansion	following	successful	attacks.	In	some	models,	due	to	the	small	number	of	observations,	the	statistical	significance	drops	slightly	below	the	acceptable	levels.	However,	overall	the	direction	of	the	relationship	holds.	[Table	7	about	here.]	
Conclusion	This	paper	examines	the	effect	of	violence	on	land	control	in	the	case	of	the	Israeli-Palestinian	conflict	during	the	Second	Intifada	(2000-2005),	and	finds	that	successful	Palestinian	attacks	against	Israelis	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	subsequent	establishment	of	illegal	Israeli	outposts	in	the	WB	during	this	period.	The	results	suggest	that	successful	suicide	attacks	during	these	years	increased	the	number	of	outposts	in	suicide	bombers'	districts	of	origin.	Similarly,	fatal	attacks	against	Israelis	within	the	WB	during	this	wave	of	violence	lead	to	an	expansion	of	outposts	in	districts	where	the	attacks	took	place.	This	effect	is	statistically	and	substantively	significant.	It	is	also	an	immediate	effect	that	can	be	measured	three	
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months	after	an	attack.	The	immediacy	of	the	effect	echoes	Jaeger	et	al.’s	findings	with	respect	to	the	increase	in	radical	attitudes	among	Palestinians	exposed	to	Israeli	violence.52	There	are	several	mechanisms	that	can	explain	why	successful	attacks	lead	to	more	outposts.	First,	it	is	possible	that	outposts’	expansion	is	a	form	of	punishment	or	revenge	that	is	inflicted	by	settlers,	even	with	government's	tacit	approval,	on	Palestinian	communities	they	perceive	to	be	related	to	violence	in	order	to	deter	Palestinians	in	these	areas	from	collaborating	with	the	hardliners	in	the	future.	This	explanation	is	consistent	with	previous	studies	that	document	an	increase	in	inter-group	animosity	and	intra-group	cohesion	following	exposure	to	violence.53	If	this	mechanism	is	at	work,	then	it	is	important	for	policy	makers	also	to	consider	the	possibility	that	outposts	themselves	can	lead	to	radicalization	and	mobilization	of	the	local	Palestinian	population.	In	fact,	the	primary	goal	of	the	attacks	may	be	to	provoke	the	government	or	the	settlers	into	a	forceful	response	that	in	turn	would	radicalize	the	Palestinian	population	and	increase	their	support	for	the	hardline	factions.54	Successful	attacks	may	also	provide	an	opportunity	to	expand	the	Israeli	territorial	control	in	the	WB,	given	that	the	public	moves	rightward	following	terrorism.55	Indeed,	very	often	following	deadly	Palestinian	attacks,	right	wing	leaders	vow	to	expand	settlements	–	statements	that	may	signal	to	settlers	that	they	are	free	to	expand	outposts.		This	explanation	fits	the	sons	of	the	soil	account	of	civil	conflict56,	whereby	settlers	as	members	of	the	dominant	majority	group,	backed	by	the	state,	move	into	territories	that	belong	to	the	minority	group	and	expand	their	
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territorial	presence	that	further	prolongs	the	conflict,	and	makes	it	more	difficult	to	reach	a	solution.	Whether	outposts’	growth	following	attacks	is	motivated	by	revenge	or	by	the	public	and	elite	support	for	territorial	expansion,	these	results	suggest	that	violence	may	have	substantial	effects	on	land	control	and	beyond.	Outposts	not	only	attract	radical	settlers	who	further	contribute	to	escalation,	but	are	also	used	as	launch	pads	for	the	so-called	‘price	tag’	operations	that	result	in	Palestinian	casualties,	damage	to	property,	spark	tensions,	and	may	even	lead	to	violence.57	Thus,	by	illuminating	the	connection	between	violence	and	the	expansion	of	outposts,	this	paper	contributes	to	the	understanding	of	cycles	of	violence	in	the	Israeli-Palestinian	conflict.		The	findings	reported	here	are	also	consistent	with	studies	that	highlight	the	cost	that	violence	imposes	on	the	perpetrators’	communities.58	Likewise,	these	findings	contribute	to	the	body	of	works	that	find	that	terrorism	does	not	promote	the	political	goals	of	groups	that	use	it59	because	they	highlight	that,	at	least	in	the	short	term,	Palestinians	lose	land	following	attacks.		The	results	of	this	paper	may	appear	at	odds	with	some	other	recent	works,	such	as	Thomas	who	reports	that	rebel	groups	who	use	terrorism	are	more	likely	to	be	invited	to	a	negotiating	table	and	offered	more	concessions.60	One	difference	between	this	analysis	and	Thomas	is	that	this	paper	does	not	focus	on	the	political	process,	but	on	changes	in	land	control.	Furthermore,	the	analysis	here	looks	at	the	short	term	(comparison	of	quarter	before	and	after	an	attack),	and	within	a	specific	time	frame	of	this	particular	conflict.	Thus,	it	is	not	entirely	inconsistent	with	
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Thomas	because	it	is	possible	that	the	government	tacitly	supports	outposts’	expansion	to	weaken	the	Palestinian	position	in	negotiations.	Likewise,	it	is	possible	that	settlers	build	outposts	to	establish	``facts	on	the	ground’’	in	anticipation	of	future	negotiations.			 	 	
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	Figure	1:	Map	of	Israel	and	the	Palestinian	districts	in	the	WB	and	Gaza	strip
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	Figure	2:	Map	of	Israeli	settlements	(blue)	and	outposts	(orange)	in	the	WB	Source:	Peace	Now	http://peacenow.org.il/eng/sites/default/files/SWBSide%20June%202009.pdf		
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Variable	 N	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	Number	of	outposts	 264	 4.8	 6.0	 0	 24	Private	Palestinian	land	in	outposts	(in	square	meters)	 264	 244,830	 472,202	 0	 2,159,010	Attempted	suicide	attacks	 264	 0.5	 1.1	 0	 8	%	district-quarters	with	successful	suicide	attacks	 264	 20%	 40	 0%	 100%	Attempted	attacks	in	the	WB	 264	 1.9	 3.5	 0	 25	%	district-quarters	with	successful	attacks	in	the	WB	 264	 30%	 40	 0%	 100%	Settler	population	 264	 19,839	 18,331	 9900	 61,613	%	Secular	settlers	 264	 26.1% 22.4	 1.3%	 75.2%	%	Religious-nationalistic	settlers	 264	 33.7%	 24.6	 0%	 78.9%	%	Orthodox	settlers	 264	 11.2%	 20.8	 0%	 62.5%	Palestinian	population	 264	 188,213	 133,205	 34,188	 507,611	Palestinian	unemployment	rate	 264	 21.5%	 7.9	 7.3%	 45.1%	
Note:	This	table	presents	summary	statistics	of	the	main	variables	at	district-quarter	level.			 Table	1:	Summary	Statistics.		 	 	
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Variable	 Failed	
suicide	
bombers	
Successful	
suicide	
bombers	
Diff.	 p-Value	of	
Diff	Outposts	 11	(1.11)	 6.4	(0.72)	 4.6***	(1.75)	 0.00	Private	Palestinian	land	in	outposts	(square	meters)	 693,065	(127,623)	 342,710	(61,378)	 350,355**	(172,785)	 0.02	Settler	population	 10,902	(3.91)	 16,008	(2.28)	 -5,107	(5.58)	 0.18	Secular	settler	population	 14.5%	(5.80)	 24.3%	(2.89)	 -9.7%	(7.18)	 0.09	%Nationalistic-religious	settlers	 48.2%	(5.93)	 35.8%	(3.63)	 12.4%	(8.84)	 0.09	%Orthodox-religious	settlers	 5.1%	(4.71)	 11.5%	(2.89)	 -6.4%	(7.05)	 0.18	Palestinian	population	 303,860	(24.53)	 230,208	(15.52)	 73,652**	(37.71)	 0.03	Palestinian	unemployment	rate	 24%	(2.57)	 26.2%	(0.99)	 -2.2%	(2.55)	 0.19	N	 10	 54	 	 	
Note:	This	panel	compares	the	means	of	district-quarters	from	which	failed	and	successful	suicide	bombers	originated	(standard	deviations	are	in	parentheses).	p-values	are	from	one-sided	t-tests.	**	Difference	of	means	is	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	***	Difference	of	means	is	statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level.		 Table	2:	Comparison	of	district-quarters	of	origin	of	failed	and	successful	suicide	bombers.		 	 	
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Variable	 Failed	
attacks	
within	
district	
Successful	
attacks	
within	
district	
Diff.	 p-Value	of	
Diff	
Outposts	 5.7	(0.76)	 6.8	(0.80)	 1.1	(1.10)	 0.17	Private	Palestinian	land	in	outposts	(square	meters)	 295,453	(62,311)	 394,797	(74,645)	 -99,344	(96,580)	 0.15	Settler	population	 21,970	(2.08)	 19,886	(2.26)	 2,084	(3.07)	 0.25	Secular	settler	population	 22.8%	(2.55)	 22.0%	(2.56)	 0.8%	(3.63)	 0.41	%Nationalistic-religious	settlers	 31.8%	(2.74)	 35.7%	(2.71)	 -3.9%	(3.88)	 0.15	%Orthodox-religious	settlers	 14.1%	(2.70)	 14.1%	(2.27)	 0.0%	(3.87)	 0.49	Palestinian	population	 189,166	(14.50)	 241,821	(17.19)	 52,655***	(22.32)	 0.01	Palestinian	unemployment	rate	 23.2%	(0.88)	 23.7%	(1.05)	 -0.5%	(1.36)	 0.37	N	 75	 65	 	 	
Note:	This	panel	compares	the	means	of	district-quarters	in	which	failed	and	successful	attacks	against	Israelis	in	the	WB	took	place	(standard	deviations	are	in	parentheses).	p-values	are	from	one-sided	t-tests.	***	Difference	of	means	is	statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level.		 Table	3:	Comparison	of	district-quarters	with	failed	and	successful	attacks	against	Israeli	civilian	and	mixed	targets.		 	
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Variable	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Successt-1	 0.547***	(0.185)	 0.852***	(0.244)	 0.390**	(0.159)	 0.528**	(0.221)	ΔSettler		populationt	 	 	 0.03	(0.100)	 -0.486	(0.300)	%ΔSecular	settlerst	 	 	 -0.031	(0.045)	 0.380	(0.371)	%ΔReligious-nationalistic	settlerst	 	 	 -0.046	(0.057)	 -0.155	(0.364)	%ΔOrthodox	settlerst	 	 	 0.469**	(0.176)	 0.939**	(0.379)	ΔPalestinian	populationt	 	 	 0.067***	(0.009)	 0.152***	(0.029)	ΔPalestinian	unemploymentt	 	 	 0.056*	(0.026)	 0.134**	(0.045)	Intercept	 0.305	(0.141)	 	 0.103	(0.056)	 -0.098	(0.061)	R2	 0.04	 0.05	 0.30	 0.50	F	test	 8.72	 12.21	 50.46	 54.67	N	 264	 64	 264	 64	
Note:	OLS	regression	of	the	change	in	the	number	of	outposts	between	t-1	and	t+1	in	suicide	bombers’	districts	on	attack	outcome	in	quarter	t	(success	indicator).	Columns	(1)	and	(3)	present	results	using	all	districts	(comparing	the	effect	of	successful	attacks	to	fails	and	no	attacks).	Columns	(2)	and	(4)	use	only	districts-quarters	with	attempted	attacks,	and	compare	success	to	failure	conditional	on	an	attack.	Standard	errors	and	p-values	are	computed	using	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	district	level.	The	shaded	row	highlights	the	variable	of	interest.		*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01		 Table	4:	Suicide	attacks	and	outposts’	expansion	in	attackers’	home	districts		 	
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Variable	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Successt-1	 0.998***	(0.258)	 0.849***	(0.242)	 0.791***	(0.188)	 0.704***	(0.189)	ΔSettler		populationt	 	 	 -0.011	(0.084)	 -0.061	(0.122)	%ΔSecular	settlerst	 	 	 0.031	(0.048)	 0.051	(0.098)	%ΔReligious-nationalistic	settlerst	 	 	 -0.039	(0.053)	 -0.096	(0.153)	%ΔOrthodox	settlerst	 	 	 0.489**	(0.164)	 0.715**	(0.263)	ΔPalestinian	populationt	 	 	 0.057***	(0.010)	 0.072***	(0.015)	ΔPalestinian	unemploymentt	 	 	 0.048*	(0.023)	 0.053*	(0.027)	Intercept	 0.171**	(0.061)	 0.320***	(0.101)	 0.018	(0.046)	 0.058	(0.099)	R2	 0.17	 0.10	 0.38	 0.39	F	test	 14.96	 12.36	 69.02	 98.66	N	 264	 140	 264	 140	
Note:	OLS	regression	of	the	change	in	the	number	of	outposts	between	t-1	and	t+1	in	WB	districts	where	attacks	take	place	in	quarter	t	(success	indicator).	Columns	(1)	and	(3)	present	results	using	all	districts	(comparing	the	effect	of	successful	attacks	to	fails	and	no	attacks).	Columns	(2)	and	(4)	use	only	districts-quarters	with	attempted	attacks,	and	compare	success	to	failure	conditional	on	an	attack.	Standard	errors	and	p-values	are	computed	using	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	district	level.	The	shaded	row	highlights	the	variable	of	interest.		*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01		 Table	5:	Suicide	attacks	and	outposts’	expansion	in	districts	where	attacks	take	place		 	
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Variable	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Successt-1	 2.120**	(0.800)	 3.408**	(1.270)	 3.512***	(0.766)	 2.777***	(0.696)	ΔSettler		populationt	 -0.263		(0.428)	 -3.400**	(1.167)	 -0.363	(0.362)	 -0.520	(0.557)	%ΔSecular	settlerst	 0.060	(0.326)	 1.744	(1.763)	 0.091	(0.315)	 0.285	(0.478)	%ΔReligious-nationalistic	settlerst	 0.168		(0.367)	 -0.295	(1.527)	 0.194	(0.335)	 0.324	(0.766)	%ΔOrthodox	settlerst	 2.067**		(0.681)	 4.523*	(2.040)	 2.170***	(0.623)	 3.027**	(1.002)	ΔPalestinian	populationt	 0.170**	(0.057)	 0.481***	(0.150)	 0.145	(0.083)	 0.186	(0.109)	ΔPalestinian	unemploymentt	 0.142*	(0.075)	 0.468**	(0.150)	 0.110	(0.065)	 0.126	(0.071)	Intercept	 0.872*	(0.395)	 0.021	(0.361)	 0.549*	(0.295)	 1.136	(0.681)	R2	 0.19	 0.38	 0.27	 0.26	F	test	 11.21	 36.20	 7.47	 16.83	N	 243	 57	 243	 132	
Note:	OLS	regression	of	the	change	in	the	area	of	Private	Palestinian	land	seized	for	outposts	between	t-1	and	t+1	in	WB	districts.	Only	results	with	control	variables	are	presented	for	brevity	purposes.	Columns	(1)	and	(2)	present	the	effect	of	successful	suicide	attacks	on	outposts’	expansion	in	the	perpetrators’	districts	of	origin.	Columns	(3)	and	(4)	show	the	effect	of	fatal	attacks	in	the	WB	on	outposts	growth	in	districts	where	these	attacks	take	place.	Columns	(1)	and	(3)	use	all	districts,	and	columns	(2)	and	(4)	only	districts	from	which	or	in	which	attacks	were	attempted.	Standard	errors	and	p-values	are	computed	using	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	district	level.	The	shaded	row	highlights	the	variable	of	interest.		*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01		Table	6:	Outposts	expansion	measured	in	square	meters	on	Private	Palestinian	land	used	for	outposts		 	
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Variable	 Negative	binomial	model	 OLS	with	lagged	DV	(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Suicide	attack	successt-1	 1.040	(0.038)	 	 0.281**	(0.097)	 	WB	attack	successt-1	 	 1.10*	(0.058)	 	 0.200	(0.118)	Intercept	 0.011**	(0.006)	 0.007***	(0.005)	 -0.795	(0.875)	 -0.134	(0.590)	Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	R2	 0.47	 0.49	 0.99	 0.99	N	 61	 135	 61	 135	
Note:	Model	1	reports	the	results	of	a	negative	binomial	regression	of	the	number	of	outposts	in	district	i	on	a	binary	indicator	(lag)	of	a	successful	suicide	attacks	coming	from	district	i.	Model	2	reports	the	same	model,	only	this	time	the	number	of	outposts	in	district	i		is	regressed	on	a	binary	indicator	(lag)	of	fatal	attacks	in	district	i.	The	coefficients	are	reported	in	terms	of	incidence	rate	ratios	(IRR).	Models	3	and	4	report	the	same	models,	only	this	time	using	an	OLS	with	lagged	dependent	variable	instead	of	the	negative	binomial	model.	All	models	include	controls.	The	sample	is	limited	to	districts	with	attempted	attacks.	Robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	district	levels	are	in	parentheses.		*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01		 Table	7:	Robustness	checks.												
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